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This paper investigates the housing schemes proposed in connection with the Volta River 
Project, Ghana, in the mid-1950s to early 1960s. The Volta River Project formed part of 
Kwame Nkrumah’s vision for Ghana’s modernisation and industrialisation in the wake of 
political independence. Three associated worker housing schemes demonstrated somewhat 
contradictory design and construction methods, from high specification, extensive amenities 
and comprehensive servicing, through to self-build ‘core’ houses amounting to little more than 
single room dwellings. The paper traces the complex and controversial history of these 
schemes, supplemented with findings of several field trips to the settlements in question, to 
unravel the value of the ‘Core Houses’ approach. The most successful project to incorporate 
indigenous agency and true collaboration was the semi-formal ’Combined Area’ housing at 
Akosombo, . a positive model for shared agency and collaboration in planning, housing and 
facilities delivery. Sitting along side the carefully manicured plan of Akosombo, with its 
regulated market, excellent health care and desire to set high standards of cleanliness, the 
Combined Area has not only provided homes for the lower-paid and labouring workers of the 
town, but has developed over time into a settlement where professionals and retired 
government workers are also now residing, not out of necessity but by choice. By actively 
developing their own homes, shared spaces and amenities there has developed a strong sense of 
ownership, community and identity. The success and level of attachment to this settlement 
clearly extends beyond its material presence and through the shared experience of helping to 
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The problem of appropriate and affordable housing became a critical issue in post-war 
developing countries, in particular the case of Ghana. This West African nation presents an 
intriguing set of conditions during its period of transition from a colony to an independent 
nation in the 1950s and early 1960s. As elsewhere, the transitional impact from British colonial 
rule to independence was turbulent. Ghana, as a new nation, was very much a crucible for 
radical ideas, innovative solutions and creative designs, mixed with a new prospect of 
international commerce and manufacturing, all fuelled by a political thirst for democratic 
‘modernisation’. Indeed, this radical, progressive edge had long been recognised in the days of 
the Gold Coast (later renamed Ghana) when it was treated as a ‘pilot colony’ for British West 
Africa, and where new ideas in planning and housing were first tested.  As the first nation in 
Sub-Saharan Africa to attain self- rule in 1957, Ghana’s long history of missionary education 
and successful cocoa export crop production had led to the early emergence of a group of 
active African elites who  initiated the creation of new political organisations such as the 
Aborigines Protection Society  and had members sitting on the Legislative Council with influential 
views and ideas on decisions of planning and building regulation.1  
 
This blend of local resistance and progressive improvement coupled with a desire for trade, 
progress and education, created a particularly fertile setting for town improvement and 
construction. As will be discussed later, there was a range of experimental practices, sometimes 
triggered by neglect and disease, or otherwise by intentions of ‘self-help’, educational provision 
and attempts to use cheaper, locally available materials and skills. ‘The usual recipe’, Sylvester 
notes,  ‘called for local use of resources rationally, in tandem with assistance from developed 
countries, and within a democratic environment.’ 2  In part Ghana followed this model, but as a 
result of its relative geographical  proximity to the UK (mailboats could make the West Africa 
trip in around two weeks),  the nation benefited from relatively fast access to British products, 
design expertise and building contractors. This meant the nation had instances of parallel or 
synchronised development processes with the UK. The Accra ring-road for example was built 
shortly after the UK’s first ring-road (1928); social provisions such as libraries and community 
centres also closely tracked (and sometimes surpassed) those efforts to deliver these facilities in 
the UK. Furthermore, in terms of construction technology and materials research, Ghana had a 
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building research station which employed progressive, mainly expatriate architects and planners. 
Innovative designs and constructions, such as Denys Lasdun’s aluminium domed roof structure 
on its National Museum and the daring cantilevered structures of the KNUST stadium in 
Kumasi, were also realised in the 1950s and 60s in the new nation. Whilst these ‘up-to-the-
minute’ innovations might have grabbed headlines and demonstrated Ghana’s receptivity to 
new, international ideas, this investment in radical design ideas and technological developments 
for the future was limited to only a few of these high profile examples. The reality was that 
much of the newly independent nation was  behind in development and needed more basic 
services and infrastructure. 
 
The procurement of large, infrastructural and industrial schemes, such as the Volta River 
Project, sought to address this shortfall and hoped to achieve a rapid and wide-ranging 
modernising jolt, propelling the country into ‘the now’ within a compressed timeframe. This 
was certainly the ambition for Ghana which had previously been an exporter of raw materials – 
such as agricultural produce, timber and minerals often in their unrefined states. Through the 
extension of railways, the creation of Takoradi port in 1928 and the Smelted Aluminium export 
port, at Tema in the late 1950s, Ghana was hoping to economically leap-frog into the ‘modern’ 
age. These infrastructural developments went beyond the country’s previous industrial base. A 
programme of ‘Development and Welfare’ grants was initiated by the British Colonial Office in 
the wake of the Second World War.3  The colonial government was mainly concerned with 
bringing about social and practical shifts in living conditions through education and healthcare 
provision (as well as hoping to quash civil unrest). It also had an implicit agenda to bring about 
economic benefits to both colonised recipients and the colonising nation as the donor. These 
grants funded building projects and associated infrastructure; the  development was a catch-all 
term for a much broader sense of modernisation, industrialisation, enhancement of productivity 
and mechanisation. Many of these were isolated projects  delivered piecemeal with little 
strategic coherence or overview of regional planning. The Volta River Project would challenge 
this myopic view by planning and delivering a ‘joined-up’ development, which was truly unique 




Made up of five main infrastructure components, each a major undertaking in its own right, the 
proposal included a new port; dam and hydro-electric system; aluminium plant; railway; and 
almost as a by-product - a planned settlement for worker housing. It was an ambitious, far-
sighted project that demonstrated a coherent approach to transportation, energy production 
and industrial development, as well as moving away from the export of raw to highly processed 
material.4 The Project initially commenced in the late colonial period as a means of producing 
aluminium within the pound sterling zone and was then adopted as a nation building spectacle 
up to and following independence. It quickly became a machismo nationalist display of power 
and an optimistic demonstration of what the country might become. For Kwame Nkrumah, the 
Prime Minister from 1951 and leader of the independence movement, the project was to fulfil 
his vision of a developed, progressive country unbridled from the choke of colonialism. 
Furthermore, it was not merely driven by economic concerns but would also bring about 
changes in social conditions, education provisions, health and technological solutions, 
mirroring those of the West. The development of roads, docks, education systems, electricity 
networks, sanitation projects and so on, were all symbolic and physical manifestations of 
modernisation. These were gestures of what would become post-colonial expressions of the 
new state. Contrary to the colonial regime which used the lack of infrastructure and general 
‘development’ as reasons that justified the continuation of occupation, and the necessity for 
these forms of development to be in place before the granting of self-rule, Ghana’s first 
independent government saw the deployment of such infrastructure triumphant symbols of 
freedom, progress and new beginnings. This refuted the argument to deny independence that 
rested purely on the basis of not having a university, a schooling system or an industrial base. 
Thus in the the post-independence period, the acquisition of this kind of infrastructure meant 
the nation could show concrete symbols of modernisation and development. This was deemed 
a way of escaping what Chakrabarty termed the historical ‘waiting room’ in order to enter the 
‘now’.5 Such process of modernisation through large scale infrastructural development was not 
a ‘clean break’ or a complete purge of the colonial approach, but instead, maintained a certain 
degree of continuity, and that any criticisms of it would be quashed as being unpatriotic. 
 
Rather than focusing on the four large scale infrastructural aspects of the Volta River Project, 
this paper investigates the housing provision and resettlement programmes connected to the 
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scheme. As revealed through these solutions at the level of the everyday, we are able to track 
and examine both colonial and post-colonial notions of ‘development’ and ‘aid’, as well as the 
growing tension displayed between technological advances, economic realities and social shifts. 
Over the course of just ten years, a rapidly changing approach to state involvement in housing 
production can be observed. Some of the more experimental approaches tolerated communal 
self-build projects, but these sporadic attempts at do-it-yourself were overshadowed by the 
regimented, costed and policy driven schemes. The colonial and early independence period was 
dominated by these two seemingly contradictory methods: one upskilling the end-user (and 
somewhat negating government responsibility) and the other a top-down autocratic tactic with 
tight governmental oversight. The later would pursue high specifications in terms of materials, 
finishes and sanitation appliances, as well as including provisions for social amenities such as 
playgrounds, community centres and market grounds. Key decisions remained in the hands of 
of funders; success was measured in quantitative figures and images, with little value placed on 
local experience. The first at Kpong was a ‘top-down’ masterplan proposed by the American 
planner Albert Mayer. There was significant ambition in this approach that could have resulted 
in a major new conurbation for Ghana and delivered a strong political message of intent for the 
newly independent nation. However, the funding model for producing the new town relied on 
foreign investment and the town’s lavish social ambition and full provision of amenities were 
deemed too expensive for the sponsoring Canadian-UK Aluminium smelters. Despite the 
political desire to improve the quality of these housing estates, they represented a kind of neo-
colonial approach with African residents as passive recipients and the estates seem as symbolic 
manifestations of modernisation, rather than comprehensive attempts at rehousing the masses. 
The planners for two further schemes that followed at Ajena mooted the option of fully 
prefabricated housing before finally settling on a ‘self-build’ approach using prefabricated 
components. There was still a desire to provide a fixed, resolved and ‘complete’ site plan along 
with schools, markets, community centres and hospitals, but these too were prohibitively 
expensive to realise and to sustain. The only housing proposal that was successfully 
implemented and sustained was at New Ajena, which was a compromise between 
prefabrication and self-build approaches. This was deeply influenced by the internationally 
recognised ‘Site and Services’ approach, with Charles Abrams and Otto Koenigsberger 
advocating housing that was regulated and loosely planned, whilst also exploiting local materials 
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and skills. It was a method that John F. C. Turner would go on to widely promote following his 
pioneering work in South America, but it is important to stress that earlier precedent existed at 
the Ghanaian planned neighbourhood of Asawasi in the 1940s, with a non-determinant 
approach to site planning.   
 
A third method, a hybrid solution, provided a basic master-plan containing ‘core’ houses. At 
New Ajena, basic single room structures with a verandah known as ‘Core Houses’ would be 
built by skilled and paid labour using local materials. These enabled the new residents to quickly 
occupy the structures without the need for temporary or remote housing in the interim. The 
Core Houses could then be gradually extended and improved according to a prescribed plan 
and quality to suit the residents’ needs and budget. These simple structures provided a 
rudimentary single-room house that residents could extend, according to prescribed standards, 
as needs and finance allowed. These houses utilised local materials and skills, which alleviated 
the need for imported materials and technologies, whilst also enabling large numbers people to 
be housed without the need for temporary shelters during the construction period.   
 
 
Background to the Volta River Project 
Initial ideas for hydro-electricity in the Volta region, in central Ghana, were first proposed as 
early as 1924, but very little progress was made until reconnaissance flights and contour surveys 
were made in 1944.6 Engineer William Halcrow (1883-1958) was appointed in 1949 to 
investigate the proposal’s feasibility.7 British commitment to the project was cautious and 
floundering, and they sought to mitigate some of the risks to other commercial and 
government partners.8 The Gold Coast Government was to fund the port, rail, roads and 
township at Tema. A separate quasi public sector body called the Volta River Authority (VRA) 
was to build the dam and power-station and a consortium of Canadian and UK aluminium 
companies were to fund and build the smelter and associated new town at Kpong. 
Located just 100km north from the capital Accra, the Volta River’s narrow gorge at Ajena 
offered the perfect site to install a hydro-electric dam (Fig. 1, 2).  Smelting aluminium served 
the dual purpose of using large amounts of this electricity (and thereby helping to reduce the 
unit cost of production), whilst also exploiting the country’s large Bauxite reserves. The 
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aluminium would then be transported by rail to the coast for export, via new port facilities at 
Tema.9  
 
The project formed an important manifestation of Nkrumah’s vision and thus became a 
centrepiece development objective highlighted in the Party’s 1951 manifesto during the drive 
for independence.10 It was a significant and ambitious project for the emerging nation; its size 
and complexity resulted in the creation of one of the first  complex multinational ventures in 
Africa, and with this, the involvement of a number of actors with various vested interests. The 
Volta project was a nationalistic grand project, its realisation however was largely reliant on 
foreign capital and expertise, and long term forecasts of international commodity markets. 
Housing was initially a secondary concern within this larger project, but became increasingly 
integral to the wider scheme. This was not least because the large population of construction 
and smelter workers needed somewhere to live, but more so, it was part of a broader 
progressive political agenda with a desire to limit the creation of informal settlements. There 
was no simple nor uniform solution to be applied. A variety of housing solutions were pursued 
in the course of the development.  
 
Further debates in the UK parliament bemoaned the excessive surveying period and potential 
costs,11 yet by 1951 the Gold Coast planner Alfred Alcock announced, ‘The Volta River 
Scheme seems to be gathering speed.’ He informed Colonial Liaison Officer G. Anthony 
Atkinson that he was to become a member of the working party and ‘a town planner from my 
staff should be attached to the scheme for regional planning and for planning the new towns.’ 12 
More importantly, Alcock stipulated that parts of the new towns should be built in advance of 
the infrastructure to house construction labourers to ‘avoid the camps and similar 
excrescences.’13 A broad scope of works was outlined and published in a 1952 UK White Paper 
and a British-Gold Coast Preparatory Commission was appointed to deliver a full feasibility and 
costings report. ‘Human Factors’, as they were referred to in the three-volume document, 
included considerable detail on housing and neighbourhood planning, and two housing 
proposals were initially outlined.14 A further housing model eventually superseded these and 




1. Kpong planned permanent settlement: aluminium company town (1954) 
2. Ajena temporary housing for the dam construction workers (1957) 




‘This question of housing is troubling the whole of the Empire at the moment.’15 
It is important to put housing into a broader context that informed some of the later decision-
making at the Volta. A number of housing projects were delivered prior to World War Two; 
they mainly  responded to outbreaks of fire, earthquake and disease, as well as  intended to 
contain and control the African population.16 Other attempts focused on improving sanitation 
or maintaining clear residential boundaries, such as at Korle Gonno and Adabraka in Accra 
(Fig. 3, 4).17 These projects were laid out on grid-iron plans with service gullies and little 
provision for shops, schools or recreation. Later, ‘model housing solutions’ were produced as 
part of the Development and Welfare agenda, with Asawasi in Kumasi being of particular note, 
along with South Sunstresu and the experimental Rural Training Centre at Kwaso.18 It was 
these projects, lead by Alcock, that formed the precedent for a regulated ‘self-build’ that 
enabled future residents to provide the labour and to build their own homes according to 
established regulations.19 Asawasi was planned prior to World War Two with Colonial 
Development and Welfare funding as a scheme to house government workers in Kumasi on 
Asanti tribal lands. Local government employees were encouraged initially to rent out 
properties at Government approved rates and become members of the planned township 
which had primary schools, churches, a mosque and commercial facilities, all set out as part of 
the development along the contoured land ridges. At Ghana’s independence, residents ceased 
to be colonial government tenants and properties were converted from tenancies to 
leaseholders with residents being able to acquire their properties outright via preferential low 
interest mortgages.   
 
Alcock organised a collaborative and empirical approach to testing materials and techniques ‘in 
the field’, and working closely with builder-occupants to enable a self-taught system. Whilst 
building regulations stipulated that concrete blocks had to be used for all new construction in 
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the towns, Alcock was attempting to deploy adobe-concrete (swishcrete) walls with a concrete 
ring-beam at wall-plate level to prevent cracking and extend the lifespan of the structure. There 
was a considerable exchange of ideas, techniques and knowledge in this work with significant 
contributions from local craftspeople to shape the approach to construction. At Kibi further 
experiments were made to test how swishcrete blocks would perform on two houses.20 It would 
be too far-fetched to suggest that these cases formed a ‘laboratory’ of house design. It would be 
more appropriate to describe it as an empirical fettling at a very small scale. However, in 
response to the ambition for a more careful study of house construction, Alcock set up a 
Building Research Station in Kumasi and began to assemble various samples, products and 
reports to assist with his work. This was not instigated by the Colonial Office or any other body 
in the UK. Indeed, when Alcock wrote to the Building Research Station in the UK, they were 
astonished to hear about the African station and did not know of its existence.21 The 
production of knowledge and creation of innovative solutions were not generated in the 
‘metropole’ and distributed to the colonies. In fact, as we have seen here, the reverse is true. 
This haphazard nature in which technological solutions were being developed and the 
disjointed manner of sharing results revealed schisms in the integrated image of empire.   This 
reverse mode of localised knowledge production led to the absorption of experimental data 
through a process of systematisation of testing, validation and publication of results as 
legitimate research. Alcock sent a sample of mud and clay to the Building Research Station in 
the UK where they tested different ratios of concrete to earth, along with varying moisture 
contents, to ascertain which proportions best resisted erosion.22  
 
Alcock’s project was not widespread and it was certainly not central on the government agenda.  
However, after World War Two, there was a slow shift (or drift) in the colonial government 
attitude. In a House of Commons debate the Labour MP Ernest Kinghorn clearly outlined the 
situation and government priorities,  
In territories like Africa and other parts of the Colonial Empire, the first prerequisite is a 
system of good harbours. After that, means of communication must be opened up in the 
shape of better roads or new roads, and railway communications must be improved and 
must be provided where none exist at the moment…That is the basis for the great plans 
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which we are united in pushing forward in this generation. When we come to view 
progress on these lines, we find that we can reach a certain stage and then progress is 
stopped because the great human factor comes in. People must have somewhere to live 
in order to carry on their jobs in all these great projects.23 
There was a drive to deliver ‘great projects’ rather than any sense of compassion. Whilst it may 
seem obvious that a workforce needs housing, in the large mining areas around Tarkwa migrant 
workers were left to fend for themselves in ramshackle and unsafe ‘slums’ with no services or 
sanitation. The Volta River Project created the opportunity for a different approach with a 
much greater emphasis on social housing provisions, even if most housing problems were a 
direct result of government policies.  The focus on grandiose infrastructure projects would help 
to shape a new identity for the nation, and at the same time, to foster conditions for an orderly, 
census-ready and taxable  workforce. Although the Volta River Project granted home 
ownership and access to education and health provisions, the plan led to the displacement of 
80,000 people from their ancestral homes and farmlands and the nation’s mounting debts to 
foreign governments and businesses.24 
 
 
The privatisation of profit and the nationalisation of loss: A Failed Top Down Approach 
at Kpong Aluminium Smelter 
The self-build collaborative model discussed above was not pursued for the smelter town at 
Kpong. These methods and the indigenous knowledge that contributed to the project were 
completely ignored. Instead, an authoritarian plan was proposed, disregarding all previous 
forms of living and social structures.25 Scott notes that ambitious schemes ‘to remake native 
societies’ proposed in late colonial regimes were fuelled by the combination of ‘welfare 
colonialism’ and their inherent authoritarian power.26 An emerging body of international 
experts, scientists and architect-planners eager to implement their latest theories, concepts and 
agendas added to this cocktail of authoritarian tendency. The rush towards independence and 
desire to make everything new also resulted in the abandoning of older approaches tainted with 
stains of imperialism.  In September 1954 the American firm Mayer and Whittlesey was 
appointed to design a new planned settlement for the smelter plant. The fan layout was 
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composed of a series of self-contained ‘sectors’ each with a population of around 2000 people. 
The model was derived from Albert Mayer’s work in India (and his aborted Chandigarh plan 
specifically) just a couple of years earlier, which probably resulted in him receiving the 
Ghanaian commission. This was coupled with Ghana’s post-war slide towards US intervention 
and foreign aid funded projects. Although he was proposing a far greater variety in the social 
makeup of each ‘superblock’,27 Mayer claimed that the basic objective of the plan was to ‘offer 
people of diverse background, education and skills a potentially homogenous community rather 
than one which is tightly compartmented into stratified neighbourhoods’ (Fig. 5).28  
This was a different approach to the strict social stratification Mayer proposed at Chandigarh, 
with its very hierarchical housing structure that mirrored the civil service ranks. He was eager to 
stress that ‘this care in the composition and designing of the town is necessary to promote an 
environment of security and stability which is of mutual interest to the employer and to those 
employed. This might be called the social structure of the plan …’29 
 
Despite the desire for mixed occupancy and its ambition to create a ‘homogenous community’ 
that sought to transcend tribal allegiance, language, social class and so on, neighbourhoods were 
generally arranged according to their building height and overall ‘density’, subsequently labelled 
as ‘L’ ‘M’ ‘H’ (i.e. low, medium and high density) Neighbourhoods. A phased construction was 
proposed to match the labour requirements of the smelter with high-density dwellings flanking 
the north and southerly edges to the town. Nestled in between was Krobo Hill with lower 
density dwellings. ‘H’ has 13 families per acre, with the highest ratio of row houses to twin 
housing, and with 3 acres devoted to shopping and community spaces. 
 
As in Mayer’s Chandigarh plan high-speed traffic was directed around the neighbourhood 
peripheries, whilst slow moving local traffic was allowed within neighbourhoods. Primary 
schools were set within central parks and internal ‘greenways’ formed continuous pedestrian 
and cycle routes connecting various neighbourhoods.30 The approach was very much a top-
down method of generating a fully-fledged town with all amenities provided, to a large extent 
controlled and imposed. The notion of planning according to density was stylistic rather than a 
response to land-value and demand. Higher buildings were presented as symbols of progress 
and reflected the desire to create a sense of urbanity in contrast to villages, sprawling worker 
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camps and cantonments.31  Provisions of education, health and leisure facilities by the 
consortium took on a paternalistic governmental welfare role, way beyond its core business 
ambitions. Other components of the town were equally revealing. The provision of roads and 
cycle-paths implied ready access to vehicles and bikes, coupled with suggestions of how ‘leisure 
time’ might be spent in parklands and trails. The market gave way to shopping facilities and 
‘community spaces’, generating what amounts to a wholesale lifestyle reconstruction for 
refinery workers.  
 
Mayer would later write about his broader vision for town planning and his desire for a much 
greater degree of ‘self-containment and less of commuting and intertravel’, 32 which was far-
sighted in many ways. But equally, he expressed a certain idealistic, if not naïve, view in trying 
to disassociate housing types from social classes and his desire for a unified, cohesive body of 
workers. 33 Perhaps, again, this was a reaction against the very hierarchical Chandigarh model, 
but his client was not concerned with such scruples or social housing hypotheses, and simply 
wanted cheap dwellings for its workers without any of the responsibility for welfare and 
amenity. There was clearly a rift, if not an outright contradiction, between visions of 
government consultants for progressive, safe and healthy homes, and the profit-lead motives of 
business.  The report which detailed that this proposal was co-funded by the UK and Gold 
Coast governments, and was at once a colonial and ‘radical’ text. Nkrumah was looking for a 
progressive shift and rapid acceleration of modernisation, whereas the UK government was 
content to give the illusion of a sympathetic and encouraging sponsor with the condition that 
they would not have to fund the venture, yet would benefit from its recommendations in terms 
of consultancy, manufacturing and improved productivity.  
 
Otto Koenisgberger (1908-1999) was a contributor to the Preparatory Commission. He was 
employed at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (an institution that had 
itself a long history of providing healthcare and housing reform in former colonies) and he had 
previously worked with Mayer in India to develop a number of new towns there in the wake of 
independence.34 In Ghana however, the housing was not government funded, and as 
Koenigsberger stated, ‘an employer in a tropical country has a much greater responsibility for 
the housing of his labour than has his counterpart in Europe or in America’.35 He went on to 
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calculate the costs of housing at around £300-400 for each worker’s family and  a total 
investment of £200,000 for a medium sized plant, ‘a sum which represents a considerable load 
for a factory of this size.’ 36 The rental income generated would not even cover the interest or 
amortisation of the loan, although Koenigsberger acknowledged, ‘there will be no doubt 
indirect benefits, but they are long term benefits and not immediate ones’.37 These calculations 
were of great interest to the Aluminium Company. The Colonial Office acknowledged that, 
‘standards are set too high and housing efforts are expended on a few, too costly model 
schemes…’ in their report on African housing. 38  Coupled with limited global demand and 
falling aluminium prices, the project was looking increasingly unattractive as a business venture. 
Despite this putting the entire dam project in potential jeopardy, Nkrumah was determined to 
press ahead regardless as he was convinced of its transformative potential. The Aluminium 
Company began to further probe details of the housing scheme and raised concerns over 
utilities such as sewage systems and issues of security and policing.39 Building a new town for 
50,000 people (and therefore one of the largest conurbations in Ghana) was proving 
economically unfeasible, and again the Colonial Office reluctantly conceded ‘it is unlikely that 
the restricted financial return, which low-cost rental housing of a satisfactory standard provides, 
will attract extensive private investment in housing…’40 Negotiating talks collapsed in 1956 and 
by 1958 the Canadian Aluminium Company had decided to withdraw from the project.41 They 
returned to the negotiating table at a later date with a proposal to relocate the smelter from 
Kpong to Tema, thereby cynically absolving them from  the  responsibility of building the 
housing, as workers would have houses to reside in Tema.  
 
Was this type of high modernism better left as an ideal or a concept? Would its execution only 
result in bitter disappointment? It was set out on paper with ambition and drive. This was what 
mattered to the administration; its actualisation as a piece of real development was considered 
not altogether necessary. So long as the project was mooted, imagined and shared, that was 
enough for it to exist as an aesthetically pleasing, well designed and fully-functioning model 
town, as the perspective illustration shows.  It was a ‘paper development’; whilst not addressing 
the housing problem, it politically served its purpose in changing existing patterns of thinking 




The Aluminium Company finally withdrew their backing altogether with the collapse of 
aluminium prices on the international world commodity markets. By this stage Nkrumah was 
seeking new partners. A Ghanaian delegation visited Russia in 1960 which opened up the 
prospect of aids from both East and West. Although Nkrumah was ‘fully alert to the danger of 
Communist penetration in Africa’, he was open to all offers of international aid and maintained 
a policy of ‘positive neutralism’.42 This flirtation with Communist governments caused much 
consternation in the UK and US, and eventually a deal was agreed with Henry J. Kaiser, an 
aluminium and steel magnate with dam building experience in the US. The smelter town at 
Kpong was aborted and the development was to relocate to Tema. This had further advantages 
for Kaiser who decided to not use Ghana’s ample bauxite reserves, preferring to import US 
bauxite for the smelter well into the 1970s, thus destroying any aspirations of Ghanaian self 
reliance in manufacturing through the use of local resources.43 
 
 
Ajena: Temporary housing and Prefabrication  
The hydro-electric dam site and project was planned to become much more than a mere piece 
of industrial infrastructure; its approach, landscape and appearance were all carefully designed 
and curated by architect-cum-garden-designer Geoffrey Jellicoe (1900-1996) who was already 
working in Accra on Marine Drive.44 Beyond its functional capability, the dam was viewed as a 
cultural installation and a scale model was prepared to ensure that it complemented the beauty 
of the landscape  as part of a strategy to entice tourists, therefore the project also included a 
hotel. The worker housing was not to dispel this triumphant tranquillity and it was proposed 
that the large construction force was to reside in temporary housing since only 150 skilled 
workers were required to maintain and operate the dam and power plant post-construction. 
This required a different approach to housing, one that could be built cheaply and quickly, yet 
still retain some of the progressive social ideals and facilities found in more permanent 
settlements. Temporary housing located close to the site was considered the most appropriate 
solution. The former head of the Public Works Department in Nigeria, Thomas Scott (1898-
1982), was appointed to produce some initial proposals.45 Despite his vast experience of 
working in West Africa it was seen as not the right sort of work. His previous projects such as 
those in Kaduna and the Lugard Hall were of a different order, more akin to the older imperial 
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approach and reminiscent of Herbert Baker, certainly not suggestive of the new and ‘modern’ 
state pursued by Nkrumah. Another ‘reputable architect with West African experience’ was 
sought out and Koenigsberger recommended Leo De Syllas (1917-1964) of  theArchitects’ Co-
Partnership (ACP).46 De Syllas had previously worked on experimental housing and educational 
projects in the West Indies, with Robert Gardiner Medwin during World War Two. He was a 
founding member of the ACP and he led the practice which had become increasingly involved 
in a range of schemes across West Africa.47  Rather than delivering the highly refined and 
‘complete’ town as proposed by Mayer, ACP preferred solutions utilising regional materials and 
techniques. They utilised local workforce expertise and accepted a more ‘rugged’ low-rise 
tectonic. The Colonial Office, ever conscious of costs and conservative by default, envisaged 
that ‘the types of houses would not be very greatly different from the standard types of the 
Public Works Department and the Housing Department, and should not be substantially more 
expensive.’ 48  
 
However, the scale of the production to house 4575 construction workers, with a projected 
total population of around 15,000 over 6.5 years, would involve considerable expense.49 This 
medium-term timescale warranted made-up roads, sanitation and other infrastructure that 
tallied with the more progressive post-war UK social policies, revolving around community 
centres and education.50 The township was to be arranged into four self-contained 
neighbourhoods, each housing 3500 people 51 which rather quickly became a substantial 
settlement. Furthermore, the undulating topography forced bespoke solutions with little 
opportunity for repetition and standard details across various neighbourhoods. Community 
ambitions at Kpong were duplicated at Ajena, extending to a 100-bed hospital, three middle-
schools, recreation grounds and cinema.52 It was eventually accepted that the standard PWD 
approach would need some ‘modification and improvement’.53 There was no discussion on 
what would happen to this workforce upon the completion of the project; they were expected 
to simply disburse having completed their mission. Initial estimates for the township were 
almost £5 million (approaching £7 million including interest) representing about ‘12.5% of the 
total estimated cost of the power project and was comparable with the estimated cost of 
building the first stage of the permanent smelter township’. 54 The general specification was 
aiming to exceed all previous works found in Ghana, offering each house ‘internal plumbing, 
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electric points and wiring and sanitary fittings. … water-flushed closets of the types appropriate 
to the user, draining to grouped septic tanks and soakaways’.55 The Preparatory Report 
professed that, ‘workers on the scheme should be helped to derive pleasure and benefit from 
their leisure hours by being given full opportunities to follow athletic, cultural and educational 
pursuits and to enjoy varied amusements'.56 It was clear that the town was ‘not merely the 
provision of shelter’ for what had previously been viewed as an expendable workforce, but was 
now viewed as an attempt at ‘the creation of homes within happy and healthy environments’.57 
Standards of design of the housing would ‘certainly lead to housing of better standard than any 
individual housing in the Gold Coast to-day.’58 
 
Any substandard or less than desirable facilities were identified and dismissed, and even 
dormitory housing for unmarried workers was highlighted as inappropriate - at least until 
costings were calculated. 59 The Preparatory Report had good intentions, but it was set out as 
more as a form o fantastical propaganda that sought to quash claims of exploitation, or 
accusations of neo-Imperialist ambition, under the guise of welfare. It was a highly polished 
document, presenting a refined image of development, that promised far more than it could 
ever deliver. The report was proof-read and assessed by Atkinson who was appointed by the 
Preparatory Committee to examine how it might be received, and to make suggestions to 
ensure positive review.60 Furthermore, these were imposed standards; at no point were the 
workers consulted on how they might like to live. The development was not really aimed at the 
‘end users’, nor to seek out their ambitions, expectations and needs. Instead, it was a defence 
statement for an entirely different audience to resist accusations of exploitation. It was unlikely 
that the committee ever believed it could be executed as they had proposed, but that really was 
not the point. 
 
As at Kpong the costs were considered far too exorbitant and requests were made for cuts with 
the overly optimistic proviso that it be done ‘without departing from the policies for obtaining 
a stable and efficient labour force…’61 De Syllas worked on modifications that could reduce the 
costs by around £1m and ensure ‘the speed of erection using a minimum amount of labour’62 as 
the chief consideration. Difficulties of providing housing for the first 3000 workers, minimising 
on-site works and handling the steep topography,63 were addressed in the strategy to develop as 
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many prefabricated components as possible with the simplest build solution. They developed a 
‘standard planning module for all buildings in the programme’, utilising a prefabricated wall 
panel sealed with bitumen and painted white to reflect the sun’s heat (Fig. 6). The roof was to 
be of long span troughed aluminium, with an internal suspended ceiling of matting. To 
encourage airflow and shade, a standard plan of one room deep with narrow south facing 
façade, wide verandahs and large openings was proposed. Each house also had a walled 
compound and it was envisaged that townships would conform to:  
 
…traditions of open-air living both in the design of houses and in the provision of open 
spaces. Each family needs a verandah space and open ground where household activities 
can be conducted, where children can play safely, and where families and friends can 
gather undisturbed.64 
 
However, in further efforts to reduce the significant costs, the initial high specification design 
was effectively reduced to a ‘shelter for sleep and safe storage of possessions’ and ‘the verandah 
or “out of doors” is the main living area.’65 It is staggering that the space and material standards 
could be dismissed so quickly on the grounds of cost expectations. It was not the size of the 
budget that was problematic, rather they simply did not want to spend that amount on housing. 
Had they really believed in the report’s principles and the value of social amenities, the budget 
would have been accepted to meet the specification, just as it was for other portions of the 
project, such as the dam and hydro-electric plant.  
 
De Syllas was proposing to use standardised manufactured components for the project and this 
was investigated further with a view to full prefabrication of the superstructure. Various modes 
of technology and manufacturing were considered in support of prefabricated options, inspired 
by the prefabricated housing studies in the USA at MIT.66 Prefabrication would however result 
in the complete removal of the ‘development’ process from the ‘developing country’, where 
everything from expertise, raw materials and the ‘final built product’ could all be imported 
completely without any local involvement. This approach would create a complete dependency 
on the ‘developed’ nations and prevent local solutions and skills from ever being pursued.67 
Ever practical, Koenigsberger systematically reviewed the prefabrication agenda and produced 
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two graphs to illustrate the relative costs of construction (Fig. 7, 8). These charts are very 
important in illustrating that the housing fabrication costs are but 46% of the total build cost 
with the remainder devoted to land cost, roads, services and community structures. 
Koenigsberger thought savings between 25-50% might be possible in the housing fabrication 
costs through ‘better design and greater attention to details’,68 but there was a limit to what 
could be achieved when the overall site costs were included. Standardising doors and windows 
and mass manufacturing (‘whilst no panacea’) may reduce ‘local difficulties’ and some of the 
costs.69 Koenigsberger used a similar method at his own house in Delhi, but he noted that the 
pre-fab solution tended to only deliver walls and the roof, which amounted to just 54% of the 
house cost (24.8% of the overall costs, including land and services); so even substantial savings 
in this area would fail to deliver the necessary impact, especially as the savings tended to be lost 
in shipping and overland transportation, and substantial ground works and slabs would still be 
required. 70Prefabrication would also be a major drain in foreign currency and largely benefit the 
European and American businesses rather than local residents and trades. Schokbeton 
prefabricated houses, for example, were imported from Holland at great expense, and following 
their inappropriate design and heavy criticisms from the UN housing report, the experiment 
was abandoned.71  
 
De Syllas continued to propose prefabricated components such as windows and doors, and 
eventually produced a masterplan composed of four neighbourhoods, each arranged around a 
central vista and park containing a market, community centre and school with housing on each 
flank (Fig. 9). Three housing types were designed including a two-bed villa (type A), semi-
detached one-bed (type B) and the single room dorm with shared bath and cooking (type C) 
(Fig. 10). These houses were of a high specification including separate bath, WC, laundry and 
kitchen facilities for the larger types. A centralised hospital was also proposed and designed by 
De Syllas.  His drawings were somewhat schematic and, as initial proposals they do not fully 
reveal how partial-prefabrication might be deployed. The fixed masterplanning, almost Beaux 
Arts symmetrical approach with segregated housing types, attempted to retain a controlled and 
‘resolved’ approach to housing and masterplanning. It was a reflection of the ‘advanced’ 
technology being installed at the dam and the need to project the same sense of discipline and 




Again, it was a position that was not only unaffordable (or within what the 
company/government was prepared to spend) but also failed to understand the reality of how 
local residents might want to live, and the relationships, complexities and uncertainties that 
were inevitably masked by a masterplan. On the one hand, it was to be temporary, basic and 
reversible, and on the other, an exemplar scheme with social provision and representative of a 
‘modern’ technology-driven venture.  How these settlements might have developed remain 
unknown because this scheme was also aborted when Kaiser moved the dam site from Ajena to 
Akosombo, but ideas persisted and were tested in the resettlement villages that followed. 
 
 
The ‘Resettlement’ Villages 
Koenigsberger later joined the UN team, along with Charles Abrams (1901-1970) and Vladimir 
Bodiansky (1894-1966) responsible for a report on housing in Ghana. The extensive 
publication demonstrated thorough and earnest investigations undertaken, as well as offering 
Koenigsberger a platform to express his long-held views on housing.  Concerned that 
‘development’ plans often benefited Western businesses more than local residents, they 
concluded that the Ghanaian government should ‘preserve and encourage the traditional self-
help methods still practised throughout the Territory. Koenigsberger and his team’s report 
pointed out that  ‘80 per cent of the houses in the country are built by their occupants…’.72 
This may seem something of a rejection of everything they set out to do in their quest for 
better conditions, but they were not suggesting that the Government renege its obligations. 
They developed an alternative approach that was cheap, utilised local skills and retained finance 
in the local economy. Houses could be built to suit specific requirements and budgets, and 
could be adjusted over time to suit changing needs. Charles Abrams later claimed, ‘by shifting 
the onus from technology [i.e. prefabrication] back to the individual, there would be hope for a 
cheap solution.’73 
A country must choose between building for the few and demonstrating little, building 
for the many and exhausting its resources, or providing for the many with a minimum 




The Akosombo dam was created by flooding the Volta River into a designated low lying valley 
area near its banks. This created one of the largest man-made lakes in the world. 80,000 people 
were displaced and lost their ancestral and farming lands due to this man made flooding.  Also 
over £10,000 worth of gin was poured as a form of libation to appease local deities and 
persuade residents of the valley to leave their ancestral homes and relinquish their land rights.75 
Resettlement grants were given to displaced residents. Despite this, the high-quality 
government sponsored housing, of the types previously proposed, resulted in rental charges 
becoming beyond the reach of most of the displaced. The UN report recognised that quality 
housing could only be delivered through self-build schemes, with some assistance towards 
roofs, doors and windows.76 A UK trade mission that followed noted four self-build methods 
that might benefit from limited government assistance including:77  
1. Roof Loan Scheme 
2. Self Help housing schemes  
3. Building societies 
4. Site and services. 
Indeed, the idea of ‘self-help’ was seen as very much part of the ‘development’ strategy 
discussed in the 1948 African Administration conference and Ashridge Conference on Social 
Development in 1954 that proposed the improvement of conditions should be brought about 
‘through the initiative of the people themselves’.78 The UN proposed that a combination of all 
these approaches was required for a successful settlement to form.  
 
The ‘site and services’ approach left the new occupier without anywhere to live during the 
construction period, forcing them to either travel long distances or to waste time, energy, 
materials and finance on a temporary shelter for the construction phase of the new home. 
Abrams’ approach was to propose what he called a ‘core house’: a basic liveable unit that was 
built by skilled labour using locally produced materials.79 The remainder of the house could 
then be finished and extended by the homeowner whilst they lived in the compact, but fully 
functioning property. In a similar fashion to squatter settlements, local techniques and skills 
were utilised, incorporating the so-called ‘indigenous knowledge’ and a hybrid of know-hows, 
techniques and materials, were deployed to achieve a safe housing standard.80 These core 
houses generally included a roof supported on columns positioned on a raised concrete floor (a 
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stoop) and one large sub-dividable room. It was felt necessary for occupants to have a vested 
interest in the the house, and to purchase it through individual or community loans. In 
pursuing this idea Abrams had taken aspects of the process of industrialised prefabrication of 
components and combined them with the self-build approach. Debates in the UK followed a 
similar theme; at a lecture given by Atkinson to the RIBA on ‘Building in the Tropics’ in 1950, 
a member of the audience exclaimed:  
 
I am struck by a surprising contradiction that has emerged from the discussion. On 
the one hand people are saying that we need high standards, better standards, 
scientific standards, standards suited to the actual conditions in any given place, to 
satisfy problems of temperature, wind, heat, and warmth and so on. On the other 
hand, we are told that these standards must not be followed, that we must not build 
to them because it will be uneconomic to do so.81  
 
This was the difficulty designers and agencies such as the UN were facing. However, the 
decision to pursue the aided self-build was a progressive leap in the procurement of mass 
government housing, but not without wider logistical and social problems. There was a 
substantial delay between the migration of workers and the establishment of new homes, jobs 
and a sustainable existence. The World Food Programme was forced to intervene. It didn’t 
simply hand-out its supplies, but instead distributed food in exchange for labour. Almost like a 
modern-day workhouse, the local Ghanaians were forced to ‘clear’ 450,000 acres (182,109 
hectares) to make way for the first 18 resettlement sites.82 739 villages were eventually 
consolidated into 52 townships to benefit from economies of scale in the supply of services, 
school provision, road maintenance, markets stalls and so on. In what Bonneuil termed as the 
capturing of the peasantry into discrete, legible and controllable settlements, villages were 
turned into ‘functional units of control and command: not organic historical and cultural units 
but units of supervision and experimentation’.83 Equally, the core house sought to retain and 
redevelop certain ‘traditional’ elements that were amended as enhanced modifications to the 
housing and settlements. Three housing types were initially proposed for the resettlement 
villages: types ‘P’ and ‘R’ were designed by Ferokh Hormusji Marker  of the Ministry of 
Communication and Works, and type ‘D’ was designed by Miles Danby (1925-2011), Professor 
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of Architecture at University of Science and Technology in Kumasi (now KNUST).84 All three 
types sought to reimagine the ‘compound house’ (a single storey courtyard house), but 
simplified its layout, geometricised its collective arrangement and utilised local materials and 
skills.  
 
‘Eastern Bloc’ expertise was also being recruited at this time following Nkrumah’s co-founding 
of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1956, which brought different experiences of ‘modernisation’ 
into Ghana. Hungarian architects Károly (Charles) Polónyi and László Huszár were recruited 
through the the Ghana National Construction Corporation,  and practiced as architects whilst 
also contributing to teaching at the Architecture School at  KNUST. They also worked on the 
resettlement village layouts, preferring a dialogue with ‘the locals’ and ‘often succeeded by just 
not following the usual pre-disqualification of the peasant or African’.85 At KNUST they were 
responsible for the  revision of the architecture  curriculum to include the hypothetical task of 
designing resettlement villages, shifting the syllabus away from formal solutions and utilitarian 
layouts towards cultural investigations and social interaction, which continues to the present 
day .86  These proposals therefore tended to be tentative and exploratory, seeking a response 
from future residents and attempting less formal plans that resemble casual village clusters. 
Clearly this required great sensitivity and an approach that could deal with on-going resolution 
and additive development.  
 
Marker’s Type ‘P’ house was initially formed with one room and a larger covered area 
supported on pre-cast concrete columns. Timber joists were pre-machined and delivered to site 
ready for installation; standard door and window frames were also factory-made ready for 
installation. The house could be efficiently and simply extended into a four room dwelling with 
verandah and enclosed compound (Fig. 11). It also had a duo-pitched roof, which was seen as 
more aspirational and less temporary than the monopitch type associated with squatter 
settlements in the past. Danby’s proposal was conceived not as an individual unit, but as an 
integrated set of dwellings that would over time form a coherent village plan. It too utilised 
outside spaces and a large roof supported on columns in the initial phase, followed by the 
production of shared and communal compounds in the second phase (Fig. 12). In many ways, 
it echoed the recent interest in re-evaluating and reimagining the widespread ‘compound’ 
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house.87 The use of standard components and basic construction resulted in a rapid production 
rate with over 11,000 units completed by 1964, at a rate averaging 200 units per week.88 
 
Unlike previous schemes based on a preconceived or resolved approach to master-planning,  
Maker and Danby’s proposals demonstrated a desire to embrace the open-ended, incomplete 
and indeterminate, which also characterised Huszár’s ambiguous and diagrammatic ‘plans’ (Fig. 
13).89 Although the financial implication of providing a fully built house and social facilities was 
a major driver in this shift, this approach also signalled a departure in the way that villages and 
their occupants were being viewed. Rather than the paternalistic and overly focused 
interference of government (with its associated agenda of monitoring, recording and 
controlling), residents were ‘liberated’ to make their own decisions on the layouts, materials and 
extensions of their homes that started with only a provision of basic sanitation and structural 
standard. Huszár acknowledged the lack of data and resulting difficulties in trying to determine 
village layouts based on older, now flooded settlements. He was also adamant that if the 
planners’ assumptions about the settlements were to be proved wrong, it is ‘the plan [that] will 
need revision, not enforcement’.90 It was an approach that sought to work with residents, rather 
than trying to impose particular modes of living.   
 
New Ajena was one of the first resettlement villages to replace the former Ajena now 
submerged by the lake. Sites were selected based on being easily accessible, close to good 
farming areas and ideally at high altitude with a good water supply. This did not leave many 
options and most of the new settlements, like New Ajena, were simply placed close to the edge 
of the lake.91 The housing stock, made up of Type P dwellings, is one of the ribbon 
development loosely tracking the road and arranged in informal clusters (Fig. 14). Some of the 
current residents have lived in the settlement since its construction in the early 1960s and can 
remember various changes and developments that have taken place up until now.92 They can 
recall some larger families being forced to move from substantial multi-room structures to one 
simple room which clearly resulted in over-crowded and unsanitary conditions. Despite this, 
extensions and modifications to the original houses are extremely limited, although most have 
added an extra room as shown in Stage 2 of Figure 11, and extended the front porch as shown 
in Figures 15 and 16. Despite the claim that ‘no one would be made worse off’, water is still 
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obtained via a stand-pipe which serves as the local gathering place. There are shared latrines 
(which are generally unpopular) although many residents have constructed their own 
bathhouse. The promise of material modernisation has still not been delivered. A small primary 
school was built along with the core houses and more recently a secondary school has been 
constructed (Fig. 17). A shop provides basic supplies; most residents keep goats and chickens, 
and grow fruit and vegetables. The settlement was criticised for its unauthorised structures and 
land use, but without this cultivation, such a remote town could not have survived.93 Whilst the 
‘development’ has not quite adhered to the plan and  early proposals inflicted hardship on 
many, it is now very much a thriving settlement. Basic social amenities are slowly being added 
as the village sees fit. Significant additions to living spaces take on the form of occupying 
outdoor areas or upon the stoop, rather than extending or modifying the core house. Formal 
planning and the precise placing of buildings, overly prescriptive building regulations and rule-




Concluding Remarks and Epilogue: Akosombo a return to the masterplan  
The paper has considered the very difficult and problematic issue of providing affordable 
housing for migrant worker/resettled populations and examined the variety of planning and 
construction attempts made during the late colonial and early post-colonial period in Ghana.  
The drive for industrialisation, ‘progress’ and ‘development’ were met with vast ‘top-down’ 
planning proposals that failed not because of technological or design ability, but instead, which 
can be summarised as, weak political oversight that was complicit with profit motives of large 
business and their reluctance to invest in quality housing. Furthermore, the failure was also due 
to the complete lack of engagement with residents, denying them any opportunities to partake 
in the decision making process and to voice their desires, hopes and ambitions. It was the 
workforce that was left without basic facilities and infrastructure, and at the same time, 
expected to construct increasingly rudimentary homes.  All these resulted in growing tension 
between the technological and self-build approaches, and also between largely unaffordable 




Early attempts at Asawasi, which had a strong collaborative approach between planning 
department and builder-resident, were somewhat lost and ignored when the larger, often 
nationalist, infrastructure projects were proposed, trampling the old order in the rapid scramble 
for progress. Instead, the worker housing, such as at Kpong, was conceived as a complete and 
resolved town plan with an extraordinary array of facilities and advanced building 
specifications. The rural hut built from mud and thatch was to be replaced with apartments of 
burnt brick and concrete floors, based on plans that were seen as being universally applicable 
and of the highest quality.  The ambition for a ‘new country’, with a fresh aspirational mind-set 
freed from colonial bondage, was admirable. It presented a vision for the nation to unite behind 
and considered anything less than this would have been short-sighted and defeatist. Kpong’s 
high aims are to be commended, not least for changing perceptions and raising expectations, 
but alas, this approach also had the potential to lead to bitter disappointment as a result of 
failed delivery and broken promises. It also eroded confidence amongst professional expertise 
with local knowledge and engagement by the appointment of overseas consultants.  
Technological solutions were also questioned and the idea of factory produced housing 
dismissed when early deliveries proved not only costly but also thermally deficient.  
The cleft between visionaries and pragmatists became quickly apparent, not least when the 
proposed town was priced and profit motives of the associated industries emerged. However, 
the Kpong project clearly set out the desired standard, and if it was not to be achieved at that 
moment, it would at least set out a future goal and criteria by which other projects would be 
judged. Projects such as Kpong were not only economically difficult to deliver, but also 
revealed, despite the initial visionary fervour, a political reluctance or hesitation to provide 
housing for all. It summons questions about the role of government in providing housing, 
setting construction standards and providing financial assistance or loans. There were many 
who felt it best left to the individual, but this approach was not possible when it was the 
government who intentionally created displacement and homelessness through planned 
flooding. 
 
The masterplan gave way to ‘fuzzy’ and indeterminate planning gestures. Standardised 
components were coupled with locally available materials and trades to produce small ‘core’ 
houses that generally worked well, albeit with limited services and sanitation. The original 
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ambition to provide playing fields, markets and community centres did not materialise, and 
much of which became self-organised activities that take place in the open, without a physical 
building or landscaped terrain, all without the need for on-going maintenance and life-cycle 
costing. The UN Core House model was a success for such displaced communities through the 
determination and hard work of new residents. This laudable approach, as shown at New 
Ajena, continues to grow in terms of its community spirit and education provision, owes 
significant credit to the work and agency of the residents; officials and governmental 
institutions in turn have played a less glorious role.  
 
The shift in approach here became more about producing a cheaply available individual house 
rather than a strictly enforced village plan, and one that could use local expertise, materials and 
be built rapidly. The Core House was a convincing compromise that fulfilled these aims, and 
coupled with designs emerging from the newly formed Architecture School at the University of 
Science and Technology, generated a more investigative sociological approach, rather than 
tectonic concerns of layout, materials and technology. Where masterplans were produced, they 
were schematic gestures, rather than scaled proposals, which positioned the planner-architect as 
co-creators of the project working closely with local labour and residents. The idea of 
producing a home that could be modified and extended as the means and needs demanded was 
also a progressive approach that viewed the solution as a series of incremental stages rather 
than a single preformed answer.   
 
More broadly speaking, the success of such resettlement schemes and the self-build approach 
signalled an end to state sponsored solutions for villages and low income housing. Instead the 
agenda of self-sufficient, ‘return to innocence’ forms of small communities started to gain a 
certain appeal in the post-independence era. This has emerged in parallel to the highly 
controlled environments of places like Akosombo (and Tema) with progressive images of a 
newly industrialised nation transformed by orderly new towns, landscaped gardens and 
international hotels.  It is in Akosombo that we can see the outcome of this array of planning 
approaches being tested and perhaps offering a method for future housing projects to consider. 
Constantinos Doxiadis was appointed to plan the new town of Akosombo in March 1960; 
rather than viewing the settlement as an isolated town, he positioned it within a broader 
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regional strategy that incorporated Accra and Tema.94  Although resettlement villages continued 
to be constructed, they were largely ignored by Doxiadis, who again returned to the ‘top down’ 
micro-managed and curated approach to development. The dam and turbine were formally 
inaugurated in 1966 by Nkrumah, who also constructed a weekend hillside retreat above the 
dam. Akosombo was awarded the special status of a self-governing entity, with its own town 
manager.95 The sophisticated housing stock with carefully controlled appearance was built 
initially for the predominantly expatriate community who operated the dam. These houses 
belied the broader attempt at providing affordable village housing with generous social 
ambition and facilities.  Although the cleft between these two approaches has lessened with the 
gradual depopulation of village communities and the migration to larger conurbations, it 
remains evident that, for instance, in Akosombo, whilst excluding these self-organised core 
house communities from its official ‘image’, has become somewhat dependent on resettlement 
villagers who trade food and livestock, provide transport, as well as domestic and manual 
labour. The fixed and resolved ‘plans’ have been tempered or gnarled by this interaction. In the 
case of Akosombo, it has resulted in a new unofficial town developing along side the legalised 
and authorised portions. This new district, known as the ‘Combined Area’, could be thought of 
as a reimagined resettlement town, born out of the self-build ethos, yet with a sufficient 
population and in close proximity to a prosperous town to benefit from shared amenities (such 
as community centre/cinema/markets), which was part of the original ambition for the 
resettlements. 
 
The initially informal ‘Combined Area’, built by those who were unofficially recognised 
residents of the Akosombo new town area, in many ways was the most successful in 
demonstrating a truly collaborative approach to planning. After a period of conflict and 
discussion, the Combined Area residents are actively engaged with the Akosombo Town 
planners, and have been able to secure the infrastructure and facilities needed to ensure their 
community complied with the Akosombo town planning standards, and is now recognised as a 
neighbourhood area in its own right.  These residents had been involved in all aspects of the 
development of their neighbourhood from the selection of appropriate materials to the delivery 
of housing. With time however the planning authorities at the formal Akosombo town were 
able to advise and ensure the Combined community dwellings conformed to the sanitary and 
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construction standards expected within the township ordinances. Furthermore, facilities such as 
schools were finally provided by the authorities.  
 
Akosombo and its newly emerging Combined Area offers an approach for future planners to 
consider, and one that whilst far from perfect, reconciles many of the struggles and approaches 
presented in this paper. It has a carefully controlled town plan and highly accountable local 
mayor to ensure that the main town is properly managed and planned, complete with properly 
maintained markets, roads and facilities. Adjacent to this, the Combined Area offers a place for 
resettlement, whilst also providing facilities, infrastructure and employment opportunities that a 
smaller village in the wider region could not. Instead of presenting a finalised and imposed 
solution, the Combined Area demonstrates that a series of incremental moves towards 
‘formality’ could be more appropriate. A gradual and collaborative exchange between 
government and resident/community can be facilitated and encouraged, rather than a ‘comply 
or destroy’ building code mentality. Whilst high specifications and ambitions are to be 
applauded (and hopefully achieved in time), the deployment of an interstitial territory that can 
facilitate and encourage resettlement alongside more formal predetermined planning zones 
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